Millett's glib wisecracks and smug judgmentalism. Like thousands of others, I entered the war as a sophomore and emerged from it as a man who had successfully commanded men. And, like thousands of others, I lost my best friend and college roommate, who died serving as a machine gunner. So, I believe I speak for my generation in resenting the book's flippant tone. The book concludes with the majestic Periclean elegy for the fallen Athenians of the Peloponnesian War. The oration's tone is far more suitable for the subject than the one Murray and Millett use.

The definitive history of World War II might never be written, although Churchill's history of the war comes close.37 Yet, Churchill is such a ferocious partisan that none but the British receive the respect they deserve. If there is ever a definitive history, it should certainly have more sympathy and understanding for the suffering soldiers and civilians of all sides, and the harried, confused officers who led as best they could.

NOTES

1. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

- 2. Charles B. MacDonald. A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge (New York: Morrow 1985)
- Ibid., 468.
- Ibid., 468.
 Arthur Herman, Joseph McCarthy (New York: The Free Press, 2000).
 - Murray and Millett, 174.
 Ibid., 205.
 - 7 Ibid 206

 - 9. Ibid., 525-26.
- Ibid., Kai-shek, 232; Brereton, 440; Swiss, 408, 557, 563; Benes, 481; Graves, 518; Guderian, 69, 72; Clark, 377, 385; Pope Pius XII, 383.
- 11. Stars and Stripes had several articles during the Anzio and Cassino Campaigns quoting company commanders on the excessive casualty rates among replace
- 12. Viktor Suvorov, *Icebreaker*, Thomas B. Beattie, trans (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990). From a Communist comment that "Hitler is the icebreaker of the revo-
 - 13. Murray and Millett. 120. 122.
- 15. David Martin. The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder (New York: Harcourt Brace,
- 16. Barton Whaley, Codeword BARBAROSSA (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1973). Whaley mentions the "preventive war hypothesis" dismissively but admits that Keitel, for whom he has nothing but contempt, and Kesselring believed it. In rebuttal, Whaley cites the memoirs of Manstein and General Walter Warlimont Manstein's Lost Victories (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982) is ambivalent. The Soviet positions were suited to defense in depth but "the pattern could have been switched in no time. . . . With a minimum of delay, the Red Army [which was] numerically . . . superior to the German Army
- . could have become capable of going over to the af-ck." Warlimont, who was only a staff colonel until Barbarossa, is the only aggressive skeptic. Whaley's book appeared 17 years before Suvorov's allegations were published, so Whaley had no opportunity to respond.
- Robert B. Stinnett, Day of Deceit (New York: The Free Press, 2000). 16. Murray and Millett, 5. 19. Ibid., 84.


- 20. Ibid., 534. 21. Ibid., 534.
- 22. Ibid., 75. 23. Ibid., 266.
- 24. Ibid., 270. 25. Ibid., 271.

- 26. Ibid., 272. 27. Ibid., 417. 28. See Major Daniel P. Bolger, "Zero Defects," *Mili*tary Review (May 1991), 61-73, which is one of the most insightful analyses of the World War II command climate in Furone I have read
- 30. Murray and Millett. 47.
- 31. The illustration showing German prisoners of war at Stalingrad reads: "Of the 90,000 who fell into Soviet
- hands, barely 5,000 survived."

 32. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War), September 30, 1945, online <www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm>
- Murray and Millett. 506.
- 34. Since most German cities were founded in the Middle Ages or earlier, factories from the industrial era were almost always on the periphery or in the suburbs. City centers contained shops, apartments or cultural buildings. I was stationed briefly in Allach, an outlier of Munich. The entire center of Munich had been blasted to rubble, but in Allach, across the street from US quarters, was a jet engine factory, crudely camouflaged, finished engines still on the test blocks. Two bombs, obviously jettisoned, hit the plant. One destroyed the workers' bicycle racks; the other scattered bottles from the dispensary over the parking lot.
- 35. Murray and Millett, 331. 36. Ibid., epilogue.
- 37. Winston Churchill, The Second World War (out of

James Patrick served in Germany as a platoon leader of combat engineers in 1945 and staved in the Occupation Army after the war. He was a battalion adjutant before returning to the US in 1947. He received a B.S. from MIT and an M.S. and a Ph.D. from Harvard. After a 20-year career as a research chemist, he spent 25 years as chairman of the chemistry department of Mary Baldwin College.

Revie



FORT ROBINSON AND THE AMERICAN WEST, 1874-1899, Tho-

mas R. Buecker, Nebraska State Historical society, 1999, 265 pages, \$40.00.

In Fort Robinson and the American West, 1874-1899, Thomas R. Buecker gives more than just a history of a place. This superb book is detailed, extremely well written and filled with high-quality illustrations. Buecker, adding greatly to knowledge of the Indian War period from 1874 to 1899, skillfully weaves events surrounding Fort Robinson into the greater scheme of western expan-

What I particularly like about Buecker's history is how closely it ties in with major events that occurred on the northern plains at the height of the great Sioux War of 1876-77. Also, his depiction of civilmilitary relations during the era is particularly instructive for today's professional officers. Interagency friction certainly caused problems for a peacetime force thrown into a peacekeeping role not of its own choosing.

Buecker gives a partial view of Bureau of Indian Affairs attempts to control local agencies in situations for which it was obviously not equipped. The Army's frequent intercession on behalf of the Bureau caused great anxiety for commanders and troops. For a short time the Army was allowed control of the agencies to help stem armed violence and commanders' frustration.

Fort Robinson began as a camp to quarter troops supporting operations at the Red Cloud Agency. Eventually the fort developed into an outstanding permanent post supporting the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Indian Agencies. As temporary log structures gave way to permanent dwellings, Fort Robinson became one of the finest Army posts in the west.

Buecker describes the fort as developing in the same manner as current military installations, being built in stages as funds became available. Funding to make significant improvements came when the perceived Indian threat increased, and because of its proximity to Pine Ridge Reservation, the fort flourished.

Appendix B lists the famous regiments stationed at various times at Fort Robinson. The list includes the 2d, 4th, 8th, 9th and 14th Infantries and the 3d, 5th, 6th and 9th Cavalries. The 9th Cavalry spent more cumulative time at the post than any other. Bucker gives a balanced view of the blemishes of this well-known regiment as well as its glories.

This book is a great addition to my reference library. I will certainly take it with me when I visit Sioux War sites on future Staff Rides.

LTC Edwin L. Kennedy Jr., USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

GOD'S ASSASSINS: State Terrorism in Argentina in the 1970s, Patricia Marchak with William Marchak, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, 1999, 339 pages, \$39.95.


Patricia and William Marchak present a good basic history of Argentina's political background in *God's Assassins*. The title indicates a religious core for the Argentine terrorist war. However, although the guerrillas had third-world "priests" as perceived allies, and the military thought itself fighting a holy war against communism, the authors present nothing more than typical "God's on our side" rational.

The guerrillas believed they were engaged in nothing more than armed

demonstrations, although with terroristic incidents. On the military side, interviewees deny or minimize kidnappings, assassinations and torture. In fact, one officer denied any knowledge of such incidents in the area under his control, explaining that he was "only a lieutenant colonel."

The military won the terrorist war, but only by also becoming terrorists—enthusiastic terrorists—torturers who loved their work. The book does not evaluate the cost of such a victory.

K.L. Jamison, Kansas City, Missouri



MACARTHUR'S WAR: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero, Stanley Weintraub, Free Press, NY, 2000, 374 pages, \$27.50.

Generally speaking, there have been two types of books about the Korean War: those written by authors who meticulously detail battle-field operations but seem ponderous to most readers, and those who write with a more literary flair but often rely on others for detailed research. The best of the latter books are *The Korean War* (Max Hastings, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1987) and *The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953* (Clay Blair, Times Books, New York, 1987).

I add MacArthur's War to this select list

Stanley Weintraub writes clear, fast-moving prose about big issues of national policy as well as military operations in the field. Other writers give more detailed accounts of incidents such as the march north to the Yalu River in October 1950 and the subsequent retreat south. However, I have never read a better account of US Army General Douglas MacArthur's last months of command, during which his behavior went "from disregard of Washington to outright defiance."

A senior subordinate commander once said of MacArthur: "The best and the worst thing you hear about him are both true." In 1951, he was at his worst, as Weintraub shows in this devastating portrait.

MacArthur had never violated an order; largely because he rarely got one. The State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Harry S. Truman mentioned their concern about various military operations. However, all had invariably acquiesced to MacArthur's preference. Then MacArthur went too far. On 5 December 1950, to stop MacArthur's calls for attacks on Chinese territory, Truman issued a blanket directive saying "all public statements about foreign policy must first be cleared with the State Department; all pronouncements concerning military policy must be cleared with the Department of Defense."

Afraid of MacArthur's wrath if he were singled out. Truman sent the directive to all major military commanders and several civilian officials. such as the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, hardly a prime critic of the administration. MacArthur responded by writing a letter to a prominent newspaper: the Administration's directive was only its "most open drive . . . against me. . . . I was warned back in August from various sources—all reliable—that just such a campaign was to be initiated, based on the pretense of my inability to break out of the Pusan perimeter. That plan was abandoned when the Inchon landing took place."

MacArthur took his revenge by torpedoing negotiated peace talks, telling the Chinese he was ready to accept their surrender in the field. He went too far. Truman "could no longer tolerate [MacArthur's] insubordination."

MacArthur could be a gracious man. He had certainly charmed Truman at their Wake Island meeting. And, although relieved in April 1951, he still welcomed his replacement, LTG Matthew Ridgway into his Tokyo headquarters, telling him that "there is something wrong mentally [with the President] and he won't live six months." MacArthur, Ridgway later said, "could conceive of no possible reason why Truman would relieve him except there was something wrong mentally. . . . Really amazing!" Readers will see a lot of new books on Korea this year. They will not see many better than MacArthur's War.

> Michael Pearlman, Leavenworth, Kansas

GREAT WORLD WAR II BATTLES IN THE ARCTIC, Mark

Llewellyn Evans, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1999, 192 pages, \$55.00.


Presumably, a book titled Great World War II Battles in the Arctic would be about just that. It is not. There is no mention of major land battles such as the unsuccessful multicorps German effort to take Murmansk, the Soviet Karelian front, arctic defense or the Soviet Petsamo-Kirkenes Offensive, which was the largest battle in military history fought north of the Arctic Circle. The only land actions author Mark Llewellvn Evans discusses are the considerably smaller British/French/ Polish landings at Trondheim and Narvik, Norway, and the attendant naval battle.

The book is primarily about *naval* actions. Should it be retitled "Great World War II Naval Battles in the Arctic?" Probably not. It dismisses Soviet naval efforts as those of bunglers and incompetents and does

not address the mass of Soviet naval archive material that has been released over the past 10 years. Evans also ignores the significant role of Soviet naval aviation and the Soviet use of motor torpedo boats. The 838 Soviet naval sorties launched to support British and US arctic convoys are also given scant notice.

So the book is essentially about British and US naval and aviation encounters with German navy and aviation forces in the arctic. This is still an important topic worthy of study. However, without maps or information from German archives, the book does not greatly aid students or scholars. There is some new archival material from British and US sources, but the book is essentially a repackaging of Vice Admiral B.B. Schofield's The Russian Convoys, 1941-1945 (out of print). Interested readers would do better with Schofield's work, which reads well and has great maps.

> Lester W. Grau, Leavenworth, Kansas



PATTON AT BAY: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December, 1944, John Nelson Rickard, Praeger Press, Westport, CT, 1999, 295 pages, \$45.00.

The Lorraine Campaign during World War II occurred at a critical point in the overall fight against the Germans. Allied logistics were stretched to the limit, and the terrain was becoming less conducive to armored warfare. The fortress of Metz was in US General George S. Patton's sector. The West Wall stood between Patton and the Rhine. Adverse weather restricted air support of ground operations; Patton's Army was reduced in size; and forces under British General Bernard Montgomery received priority of effort. All of these conditions factored into how Patton conducted operations.

With its many lessons in leadership and operational art, this book is well worth reading. The maps add much to the discussion and the notes are of extra interest. There is also an excellent bibliography.

MAJ William T. Bohne, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

NOTHING SHORT OF WAR: With the Australian Army in Borneo, 1962-66, Neil C. Smith, Citadel Press, Melbourne, 1999, 191 pages, \$40.00.

In January 2000, I visited the North Borneo region of Malaysia. While walking around, I saw many "Indons," as Indonesians are called locally. It was obvious that their homeland's economic and social troubles had driven them into the bordering country. I thought, "Where Sukarno failed to penetrate Sabah, Brunei and Sarawak, his lowly peasants have succeeded."

In the 1960s Sukarno longed to include all parts of current Malaysia in a greater Indonesia. He and others envisioned Indonesia as encompassing all of the people of Malay stock or who had been part of the former Dutch East Indies. The new country would extend from the New Guinea boundaries with Papua to the regions where Malays numerically dominate and populations of Thais and other peoples begin.

The problem facing Sukarno in the northwest area of this dream plan was the British territories of the Malay Peninsula—Singapore, Sultanate of Brunei and the Borneo regions of Sarawak and British North Borneo, now called the Sabah State of Malaysia. The Malay Peninsula had just defeated a communist attempt at revolution. A political solution had been reached to have a Malaysian state encompassing all the areas on Peninsula Malaya and the areas of Borneo, less the Sultanate of Brunei.

Under Tunku Abdul Rahiman's leadership, a confederation was being born. Sukarno, frustrated at seeing an alternative to Indonesia in the northwest area, proclaimed that the British were establishing a new colonialism. His scheme was to destabilize the region and eventually incorporate it into Indonesia. The chief instruments of destabilization were subversion and penetration by military units to disrupt the Confederation

Borneo, called Kalimantan in Indonesia, has a contiguous land border between Indonesia and the new state of Malaysia. From the Indonesian side, penetrations can be made without the major water barrier found in West Malaysia. The battles that ensued occurred on jungle mountain trails. The war was a war of ambushes, booby traps and sharp confrontations between patrols. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, but it takes a while sometimes for the loser to recognize it.

Peter Charles Unsinger, San Jose State University, California

THE BOER WAR GENERALS,

Peter Trew, Sutton Publishing Limited, Great Britain, 274 pages, 1999, \$44.95.

The Boer War Generals is a fine introduction to the conflict between Britain and two Boer republics in southern Africa during the late 1800s. The US military audience knows the Boer War best from the 1980 movie Breaker Morant (Fox Lorber Productions) and E.D. Swinton's 1986 book The Defence of Duffer's Drift (Avery Publishing Group, Penguin Putnam, New York).

The Boer War Generals makes the century-old conflict come alive through the almost-always interesting technique of analyzing tactics, strategy, battles, campaigns and


force structures as manifestations of the will of a conflict's key military leaders. The book focuses on principals on both sides who demonstrated exemplary military leadership. The British generals—Lord Fredrick Sleigh Roberts and Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener—were senior officers at or near the end of long, distinguished careers fighting in outposts of the British Empire. They knew the business of deploying forces to areas of austere resources and mounting campaigns against tough indigenous foes.

Their Boer counterparts—Generals Jan Christian Smuts, Louis Botha, C.R. De Wet and J.H. De la Rey—were much younger, in most cases exercising their first independent commands. They proved more than up to the task. In fact, author Peter Trew points out that their performances foreshadowed lifetimes of achievement.

The Boer War was the first conflict that combined relatively simple aspects of conventional warfare with complicated political-civil-military issues involving political self-determination. Trew, analyzing the tactics and campaigns that led to British success, is especially good at describing the many set-piece battles fought by division-level and smaller forces to seize or defend towns, hill-tops, river-crossing points and other terrain-based objectives.

In the war's later stages, the British developed unconventional techniques to defeat Boer guerilla forces decisively. The British reorganized their brigades into columns of company-plus size forces that mounted drives in a given area to kill or capture Boer males, almost all of whom were combatants. The drives eventually broke the back of the Boers, although the British desired the final, negotiated settlement as much as the Boers. The Boer War Generals suggests just how determined an army has to be to defeat an opponent totally mobilized for self-defense, fighting on its own turf and reliant on unconventional tactics.

> MAJ Pete Molin, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



RACE FOR THE REICHSTAG: The


1945 Battle for Berlin, Tony Le Tissier, Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, OR, 1999, 239 pages, \$57.50.

In Race for the Reichstag, Tony Le Tissier, the last British Military Governor of Spandau Allied Prison, builds on his earlier work about the Soviet Union's collapse. Tissier could easily have provided a short summary of the fighting at the Seelowe Heights to set up the story but, instead, begins the historical narrative abruptly, with a breezy account of the Soviet breakthrough on the Oder Front that cleared the way for the Soviet assault on Berlin. However, this is not the definitive work on the battle for Berlin.

The book has a hasty, throwntogether feel, which is reinforced by the many errors in fact, spelling and identification. The maps included are generally unhelpful, cluttered and difficult to read. Any type of standardization for the maps would have been better than what is provided. Also, surprisingly, there is no topographical map of the Berlin area, which would reveal how terrain influenced military operations. Plus, there is no map showing the series of defensive lines that ringed Berlin. Tissier writes at length about these defensive lines, and it would have been helpful to be able to trace them on a map. Yet, I recommend the book for readers already well versed on

the Eastern Front for, ultimately, it complements other books on the subject.

LTC Robert G. Smith, USAR, Germantown, Maryland



JOSHUA CHAMBERLAIN: The Soldier and the Man, Edward G. Longacre, Combined Publishers, Consho-

hocken, PA, 1999, 395 pages, \$29.95.

Edward G Longacre's book about Joshua Chamberlain is not a biography; it is an attempt to place Chamberlain the hero in the context of Chamberlain the man. Although Longacre does not admit it up front, he uses historical psychoanalysis in his study. The result is unsettling and unsatisfying. Chamberlain is not the perfect man, and Longacre spends too much time pointing out Chamberlain's foibles. Longacre never comes to grips with the "so what?" factor. So what if Chamberlain's marriage was difficult? None of his faults seem to have contributed greatly to his actions at Little Round Top during the Civil

Nonetheless, the book deserves a reading. No hero is as depicted on equestrian statues or larger-than-life bronze images. Heroes are men and women with flaws like ours and personalities formed by accidents of birth, education and experience. Some are called to confront challenges that in retrospect make them seem larger than life. Chamberlain

met his challenge at Little Round Top and on other battlefields and lived to enjoy the notoriety. That is what sets him apart.

Longacre takes a broader view. Chamberlain is a hero because he overcame difficulties as a scholar, a husband and only incidentally as a soldier. To Longacre, Gettysburg is not Chamberlain's defining moment but one of many in a life of redemption. To me, Longacre is mistaken. Gettysburg was more important than the ultimate success of Chamberlain's marriage or his academic career, but Longacre is right in asserting that these smaller undertakings made Chamberlain the man he

COL Gregory L. Fontenot, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

THE LITTLE WAR OF PRIVATE POST: The Spanish-American War Seen Up Close, Charles Johnson Post, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1999, 376 pages, \$15.00.

This reprint of a classic memoir is part of a larger public remembering

Pass In Review

GUERRILLA DIPLOMACY: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War, Robert K. Brigham, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1999, 211 pages, \$35.00, HB.

THE ARMED FORCES of CHINA.

Desmond Ball and Ray Funnell, eds., I.B. Tauris, London. Distributed by St. Martin's Press, New York, 1999, 288 pages, \$19.95, PB.

SOLDIER AND WARRIOR:

French Attitudes toward the Army and War on the Eve of the First World War, H.L. Wesseling and Arnold J. Pomerans, trans., Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2000, 248 pages, \$65.00, HB.

The National Liberation Front (NLF) was a useful political tool with which the North Vietnamese sowed dissension in South Vietnam. It also interacted on the international stage with many communist and nonaligned nations. NLF diplomatic activities fostered the view of a true revolution against the United States and South Vietnam. One of the more important points made in the book is that the United States failed to capitalize on the differences in tactics, strategy and diplomatic policy the NLF used.—LTC John A. Hardaway, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

The Peoples Republic of China is seeking a broader role in the world's geopolitical-economic stage. A statement in the book's conclusion reflects the author's insights: "[There are] two Chinas—a China that is driven by the nationalist impulse and bent on assertive military power and a China that seeks to be fully incorporated into an interdependent world. At this moment China is neither, but it is poised to move decisively in either direction." This book is informative and insightful. I recommend it.—Richard L. Milligan, Leavenworth, Kansas

This book examines why "people so casually set off a conflict that would expand into a war which would last four years, claim millions of human lives and cost billions and have effects that can be felt even to this day." What value did the French attach to the military, and how can such attitudes be explained? The book offers important background information on World War I causes pertaining to France and explores the tension between political right and left and the roles the military played in that environment.—MAJ Jeff Smidt, USA, West Olive, Michigan


of a small conflict known as the Spanish-American War. In spite of its seeming insignificance, the war was important in the history of the US Army and Fort Leavenworth. Lessons that emerged, concerning training, doctrine, organization and logistics, operational art, expeditionary warfare and joint operations are still relevant. However, Post's memoir gives only a private soldier's view of the war. For more dimensions, readers should look elsewhere.

Post relates experiences, recording humorous, horrific or bizarre happenings that occur during battle. He speaks of his fellow soldiers in a generous but unsparing manner, then turns his full wrath on people in positions of authority who he believes abused their rank and failed in their duty. Viewed from his level, the entire land campaign was a hastily thrown-together expedition designed to help the Navy destroy Spanish Admiral D. Pascual Cervera's fleet. There was no grand strategy and the tactics, along with logistics, were rudimentary.

Post, a soldier in the 71st New York Infantry, relates his experiences on land and sea—in railcars, camps and troop ships. He explores the relationships between officers and men, regulars and volunteers, and he obliquely touches on race relations in US society. He speaks of eating surplus beef, originally intended for the Japanese in 1894, Army bacon and hardtack. He gives full, rich descriptions laced with wry wit. The book includes black-and-white reproductions of Post's watercolors. which bring scenes and personalities to life and provide a visual counterpoint to the written experience.

After the war, Post was quarantined at Montauk Point, spending three months in a New York City hospital recovering from what the doctors called "Compound-Enteric-Typhoid-Malaria." As he put it: "I was lucky. I had survived." The book is a valuable reminder that the ultimate weapon in war is the individual, motivated soldier.

Lewis Bernstein, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes, Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey, eds., Cambridge University Press, NY, 1999, 378 pages, \$69.95.

Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts

MAKING PEACE PREVAIL:

Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia, Alice Ackermann, Syracuse University Press, NY, 2000, 217 pages, \$45.00, PB.

KOREA ON THE BRINK: From the "1812 Incident" to the Kwongju Uprising, 1979-1980, John A. Wickham, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1999, 240 pages, \$20.00, PB.

CARLO ROSSELLI: Socialist Heretic and Antifascist Exile,

Stanislao G. Pugliese, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999, 240 pages, \$35.00, HB. It is difficult to find a silver lining in the current Balkan crises, but Alice Ackermann has. In her three-year study of the Republic of Macedonia she builds on Michael Lund's US Institute of Peace study of the factors that contribute to the success of "preventive diplomacy." After a short historical tour of worldwide ethnic conflicts, she defines preventive diplomacy and gives recent examples of its failures and successes. She also provides a proven model for peace and conflict prevention in Macedonia. Though many of the model's elements can be imported to other conflicts, its utility can still be reduced by two factors: unwilling host-nation leaders and an unready, unaccepting populace.—MAJ Malcolm Frost, USA, Fayetteville, North Carolina

Former Chief of Staff of the Army General John Wickham's tour in Korea coincided with one of the most tumultuous periods in modern Korean history. A series of crises threatened domestic Korean stability and severely tested the strength of the United States-Republic of Korea alliance. Readers interested in the coordination of political and military strategies to achieve national policy objectives will find much to contemplate.—MAJ Karen Gibson, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Carlo Rosselli was one of Italy's most outspoken antifascists and authored Italian "liberal socialism" during the 1920s and 1930s. This tragic-heroic account sets the power of an intellectual against the force of prevailing ideology. Rosselli's heretical philosophy resulted in his imprisonment, exile and murder by Italy's fascist regime.—LTC Lynn L. Sims, USAR, Retired, Mechanicsville, Virginia

and Regimes is a collection of 17 papers on refugee issues by 19 subject-matter experts who explore the changing ways nation-states and nonstate actors deal with refugees. The book's origin was a 1996 conference at the University of Nottingham that explored the topic "Refugee Rights and Realities: Approaches to Law and Policy Reform." Although written from a European context, the work examines worldwide trends.

The essays address international refugee law and policy, assess the rights of refugees and asylum seekers and contrast these rights with the realities of nation-state practice. The essayists often go into excruciating detail to show the legal and practical ramifications of the "evolving refugee definition."

Nicholson and Twomey also cover the developing role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who is increasingly involved in humanitarian-assistance operations. They also detail nation-state responses to refugee trends and refugees' individual rights. This highly technical book is useful for policymakers, civil affairs personnel, lawyers and planners who might have to deal with the issue of refugees in the future.

MAJ Scott D. Aiken, USMC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



NAVAL STRATEGY IN NORTH-EAST ASIA: Geo-strategic Goals, Policies and Prospects, Duk-Ki Kim.

Frank Cass, Portland, OR, 2000, 213 pages, \$57.50.

Cold War remnants still hang over Northeast Asia. The Korean Peninsula, which remains a major flashpoint, is the site of one of the potential major theater wars that US security strategy addresses. With this situation as his backdrop, Commander Duk-Ki Kim, of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy, focuses on maritime relations in this volatile area. In Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia, Kim expresses two aims—to explore options for cooperative maritime security and to examine the regional powers' maritime security policies.


This well-researched book follows the maritime policies of Russia, China, Japan and the United States from the Cold War into the post-Cold War environment. It provides an excellent discussion of regional territorial and border issues that are outside a direct confrontation on the peninsula. These issues include disputes between Russia and Japan, Korea and Japan, and China and Japan.

Despite the fact that Korean maritime strategies are in the middle of the regional conflict, Kim does not discuss South Korean or North Korean maritime policies or maritime boundary disputes. The impression is that Korea is simply caught up in the maelstrom of other nations' problems.

Kim's treatment of Japan's actions and intentions also show some of the animosity between the two countries. For example, he states: "It is likely that Japan will emerge as a military superpower in Northeast Asia in the twenty-first century. . . . The grave concerns of the Asia-Pacific region are now focused on what effect the Japanese military build-up will bring about in the post-Cold War situation in the region." This distrust of Japanese objectives can be seen throughout the book. Again, maritime confidence-building measures are only a subset of greater, political and social cooperation.

Overall, Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia provides an excellent discussion of regional problems with a specific maritime focus. However, it does not tie maritime measures to a broader goal.

LCDR David R. Grambo, USN, Virginia Beach, Virginia



JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace.

Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1999, 362 pages, \$45.00.

Although the Cold War has been over for a decade, the state of international relations and how people of various cultures and countries will interact is still unclear. *Justice Among Nations* entices readers to look closely at international relations through a careful, critical analysis of past political philosophers.

Authors Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf masterfully combine philosophy, theology and morality into a history of international relations from the ancient Greeks to the present. The authors concisely present each philosopher's major points and determine whether each proves his case. This requires extensive background knowledge of other aspects of the philosopher's thinking and of historical events that shaped the international environment of the time.

The historical journey begins in ancient Greece and Rome, moves through the Judaic, Christian and Islamic periods of theology, continues into realism and idealism and ends with modern realism and neo-

realism. Two major issues clearly have no concrete answers. First, there is an inherent and timeless conflict between realism and idealism. Second, there is disagreement whether there are timeless, immutable basic truths that govern individuals or states and, if there are, where these truths come from and whether they inspire peace or conflict.

Justice Among Nations is a well-researched, concise book. The extensive footnotes provide detail and resources for further exploration of each philosopher's arguments. This book is an excellent contribution to the study of justice in international relations.

MAJ Michael J. Johnson, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas THE BOOK OF WAR: 25 Centuries of Great War Writing, John Keegan, Viking Penguin, NY, 1999, 496 pages, \$34.95.

John Keegan is widely known and highly regarded for the intellectual depth of his historical writings. His previous works have focused on leadership, campaigns or entire wars. The Book of War is a collection of original writings that span approximately 2,300 years of warfare. Many selections are by such well-known persons as Thucydides, Xenophon. Davey Crockett, Stephen Crane, Rudyard Kipling, Erwin Rommel, Siegfried Sassoon, Winston Churchill and Ernie Pyle. Others, less famous, nonetheless bring insight to war's humanity and inhumanity.

Keegan divides his work into three parts. The theme of the first section, chronologically from the Peloponnesian Wars to 1800, is the motivation for war. The second section addresses 19th-century warfare, particularly European armies deployed outside the continent. Section three focuses on the 20th century and the explosion of technological advances in warfighting.

However, there is so much overlap among the themes that the distinctions Keegan attempts to make among the three eras are indistinct. Changes in technology lead to changes in tactics. Leadership is constant, but good leaders understand the relationships between technology, tactics and logistics and adapt doctrine accordingly.

The longbow at Agincourt in 1415 affected tactics much as the rifled musket did in a later century. Self-interest was as important to the Melians and Athenians in 416 B.C. as it was to Saddam Hussein in 1990. Separations of history into eras based on dominant themes serves little purpose and are easily challenged.

The value of Keegan's work is the assembly of primary source material. Sources cover warfare in China, the Aztecs in Mexico, Constantinople, Malta, the Crimea, the Indian wars of North America, colonial South Africa, Europe during World Wars I and II, Vietnam and the Gulf War. Students of military history rarely find a collection that contains writings by Josephus along with those of Studs Terkel. Yet, while including such diverse authors, Keegan has ensured that each author has had firsthand knowledge of the war or battle about which he writes. That personalizing of events is what brings credibility to these accounts.

LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

MRLetters

JROTC Spells the Future

The article "JROTC, Recent Trends and Developments" by Colonels John W. Corbett and Arthur T. Coumbe in the January-February 2001 issue of *Military Review* is right on target. As a retired Army officer in Southern California, I have been involved with JROTC programs through various professional military organizations.

Corbett and Coumbe are correct that JROTC is booming in many high schools. All four services have programs in Southern California. Many school districts desire the program because it teaches students discipline, responsibility, citizenship and respect for authority. I have seen the program flourish in low-income neighborhoods and in high schools composed of upper middle class students. General Colin Powell should be commended for re-energizing the program.

Although not a direct recruiting program, JROTC does orient young people to investigate the military. Graduates of JROTC are prime recruiting targets. The Army has a great opportunity to support this

and the senior program. Wise recruiters from all services attend JROTC award ceremonies in the spring to get a look at some of America's best youth.

One senior ROTC program at a local university had a joint training program with several surrounding high schools. More of such programs might orient high school graduates to consider senior ROTC at a university or pursue an appointment to a military academy.

JROTC is a great program for students from all economic backgrounds. Superintendents of school districts support the programs, and a ready pool of retired officers can become professors of military science in high schools. You have published an excellent account of a valuable, low-profile Army program and a prime recruiting area for future soldiers and officers. My only complaint about the article is the photo on page 42; it is not the best representation of an Army officer giving the oath of commissioning.

COL William J. Reals Jr., USAR, Retired, Mission Viejo, California

Video Game Review

SQUAD LEADER, Microprose, Hasbro Interactive, Avalon Hill, 2000, \$39.95. (System Requirements: Pentium II 233 MHz or higher, 32MB RAM, 300MB Hard Disk Space, 4X Speed CD ROM,

2MB Win 95/98 compatible SVGA video card, Win 95/98 compatible sound card, and Direct X, v.7.)

In 1977 the Avalon Hill Game Company released Squad Leader and overnight ushered in the golden age of board wargaming. Since the advent of computer gaming, many designers have considered producing Squad Leader, and many players have looked forward to it. Microprose, a well-known name in computer gaming, took up the challenge and produced a slick-looking game of the same title. Unfortunately, that is where the similarity ends.

Squad Leader is a turn-based, individual soldier game that misses the mark on all levels, from its flat, lifeless graphics to the soldiers' cheesy screams and shouts. Game play is hampered by an outdated and cumbersome square grid system to control movement—that is, if the player can find all of his soldiers. Many times the soldiers are hidden in the dull graphics, and the player must cut away levels of terrain to find them. Unfortunately, with every cut the map becomes uglier and less useful. A map rotation feature would have helped immensely.

The interface is less than intuitive with myriad buttons that cover the bottom quarter of the screen. To insure the right actions will be executed, the player must doublecheck these buttons' settings for every soldier. The sound effects are good, but after hearing screams of "medic" or "momma" a few times the novelty wears off.

Microprose is to be commended for trying to introduce a turn-based game at a time when real-time titles dominate the wargame genre. However, this effort falls short. The novice will become disenchanted, and the hardcore gamer will be disappointed.

> LTC M.R. Pierce, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

MR Writers' Guide

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